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Anthropology and History in the I98os 
John W. Adams 
Consensus, Community, and Exoticism An- 
thropological concepts, which have been taken out of context and 
applied without full understanding, have been misused by histo- 
rians of colonial North America. Part of the difficulty is due to 
the normal hazards of incorporating the work of another field in 
one's own; and part is due to the reluctance of historians to 
employ monothematic explanations. This latter difficulty has led 
historians to favor those concepts of anthropology which are not 
easily measured. 
ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY, AND NATURAL HISTORY The interest 
of social historians in anthropology has been one-sided. Although 
historians are excited about the work of Clifford Geertz, Victor 
Turner, and Mary Douglas, they do not seem to feel the same 
enthusiasm for the work of such antropologists as John Whiting, 
Roy Rappaport, or Marvin Harris, or of Anthony Wallace, David 
Schneider, or Marshall Sahlins, who are of equal importance 
within the field. As a result historians have borrowed only what 
was most like history as currently practiced: studies concerned 
with ideas. 
Anthropology has always been poised awkwardly between 
history and natural history, its practitioners usually preferring one 
of the two approaches, while granting that the other is also valid. 
A recent statement in the Annual Reviews, a convenient source for 
authoritative positions of this sort, sees the field divided into 
ideational and adaptational conceptions of culture, under the re- 
newed influence of Marxist thinking.1 
There is still no agreement as to whether anthropology is 
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like a science which has laws. The statement by Geertz that we 
must be content with interpretations, not laws, may have been 
misinterpreted by many historians as a denial that there is much 
regularity in human affairs-and therefore as a license to search 
out what appears to be unique. Yet anthropologists of both per- 
suasions stress that regularities and patterning underlie a diverse 
range of societies or their parts. Many seek broad trends in cultural 
evolution and explain them using a materialism which historians 
may find uncongenial. At the same time, most anthropologists 
deny that differences in cultures are attributable to the biological 
differences of their members or that history has any predeter- 
mined course. Thus the materialist position, best (and certainly 
most notoriously) represented by the work of Harris, declares 
that the factors of demography, ecology, and the economy are 
more fundamental than such superstructural ideas as the sacred- 
ness of cows to Hindus. This is an old controversy, but a real 
one to most anthropologists today. It raises problems for histo- 
rians who might wish to borrow anthropological concepts, es- 
pecially those which are ideational.2 
UNITS OF ANALYSIS A basic problem for any discipline lies in 
its choice of phenomena to study which are sufficiently well- 
defined that they can be located in actual data. Ideationalists focus 
on rules and symbols; materialists on subsistence strategies and 
population densities. Between these lie the great common-sense 
units of study such as marriage, family, and community, which 
have enabled anthropologists to uncover similarities within cul- 
tures around the world. It has been fairly easy to demonstrate that 
forms which Western Europeans accepted as perfectly natural 
were only one of several cultural variatio.:s on the same institu- 
tion. But the range of examples discovered has been so great that 
some scholars doubt whether it is possible to construct a universal 
definition of these units. Are the most extreme examples really 
instances of the same thing. Is marriage universal? Do all kinship 
systems recognize both the father's and the mother's side of the 
family as kin? Are there families in all societies? Do all societies 
2 Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in 
idem, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 3-30; Marvin Harris, Cultural 
Materialism (New York, I979). 
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have nuclear families? These and similar questions make it clear 
that anthropology is presently at the limits of its terminology.3 
The choice of significant units entails various conclusions 
about human nature which become problematic for proponents 
of different theoretical approaches to the study of man. The task 
of choosing one for application in another discipline involves a 
definite choice of theoretical perspective. To choose symbolic 
dualisms or "role reversal" is to take a position in favor not only 
of doing a certain kind of history, but also of doing a certain kind 
of anthropology, and to risk some predictable criticisms. Idea- 
tional (or symbolic) anthropology is often seen as being too con- 
cerned with the strange, the wonderful, and the subjective at the 
expense of the ordinary. 
A further, disconcerting problem for historians who wish to 
use the insights of anthropology is that anthropological concepts 
are not easily transferrable. Their particularity is not helped by 
the propensity of anthropologists over the years to study cultural 
processes which have often turned out to have existed only in the 
minds of the profession, for example the totemic complex, 
mother right, tribe, clan, and village. Even Turner, who first 
studied and named "communitas," reports that this concept is so 
evanescent that it is no sooner noticed than it disappears.4 
CONSENSUS AND COMMUNITY The most satisfactory, recent 
work on colonial America which uses anthropological insights is 
that by Boyer and Nissenbaum on the Salem witchcraft hysteria. 
By placing the dispute, and the parties to it, within the local 
network of kinship and marriage ties, they showed how such ties 
both united and separated the participants. This matter-of-fact 
account uses the well-replicated and thoroughly discussed findings 
of anthropology, particularly those of the British structuralist 
school. Such a study is, no doubt, exactly what Thomas hoped 
to encourage historians to undertake some twenty years ago when 
he reviewed the potential of anthropological findings for history.5 
3 A useful discussion of these problems runs through Ira R. Buchler and Henry A. Selby, 
Kinship and Social Organization (New York, I968). 
4 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process (Chicago, I968). 
5 Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Keith Thomas, "History and Anthropology," Past & Present, 
24 (I963), 3-24. 
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However, the early attempts to import the family reconsti- 
tution methods of the Annales and Cambridge schools and com- 
bine them with concepts from social anthropology have resulted 
in a misapplication of these concepts. For example, Lockridge, in 
his book on Dedham, Massachusetts, considers the village more 
or less in isolation from other villages in the Colony and treats it 
as a "closed corporate peasant community" which is "self-shap- 
ing." To anthropologists a basic attribute of peasant societies is 
that they are "part-societies with part-cultures" because they exist 
in relationship to a more urbanized elite. Thus there is a possible 
theoretical contradiction here between "peasant society" and 
"self-shaping" which should have been addressed. The basic doc- 
umentation for the study was derived from town records which 
do not include the relevant materials from surrounding localities. 
With regard to marriage, for instance, New England villages 
during this period were only about 54 percent endogamous; some 
46 percent of the young people found spouses in neighboring 
towns, which suggests that Dedham was not the isolated world 
of "relentless immobility" which Lockridge supposed.6 
A different point of criticism would be to ask why a social 
history is so concerned with the Revolution at the expense of the 
theme of utopianism, which is stressed explicitly in the book but 
is never used as a controlling model. Lockridge might equally 
well have compared the town of Dedham with the many other 
utopian communities for which we have good records and have 
drawn some conclusion about the degree to which its fate was 
typical of the set. Such an examination, however, would have 
shifted the focus from history to social science. Moreover, we are 
asked to regard Dedham as a typical example of the transforma- 
tion of "a world we have lost" into something prototypically 
American, though this generalization (also one of a social science) 
goes unsubstantiated. Only later did colonial historians begin to 
6 Kenneth Lockridge, A New England Town: The First Hundred Years (New York, 1970), 
I8-I9; George M. Foster, "Introduction: What Is a Peasant?" in Jack M. Potter et al. 
(eds.), Peasant and Society: A Reader (Boston, I967), 2-I4; Adams and Alice Bee Kasakoff, 
"Migration at Marriage in Colonial New England: A Comparison of Rates Derived 
from Genealogies with Rates from Vital Records," in Bennett Dyke and Warren Morrill 
(eds.), Genealogical Demography (New York, I980); Lockridge, "The Population of Ded- 
ham, Massachusetts, I636-1735," Economic History Review, XIX (I966), 318-344. 
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compare their findings about single villages in New England with 
each other, with other regions, and with Europe.7 
Often in these studies the word "community" is used not 
only to denote a small-scale settlement, such as a village, but also 
to imply a warm and closely knit social group. This implied 
correlation should alert us to ideological preferences. In the ex- 
perience of anthropologists small villages are by no means always 
warm and happy places; they typically have factions, feuds, and 
even witchcraft accusations as part of their regular functioning. 
Dissensus occurs with consensus, as happened in the case of 
Salem. 
THE BALINESE COCKFIGHT Recently, colonial historians have 
shifted from studying towns to trying to discover one social 
institution-a Court Day, horse racing, gambling, or duelling- 
which might be the equivalent of the Balinese cockfight which 
Geertz suggested was a focus of widely held values in Bali. How- 
ever, the nature of the Balinese cockfight and its possible univer- 
sality has never been discussed by historians. Is there any reason 
to believe that an equivalent might have existed in colonial Amer- 
ica? To search one out is a task to which many anthropologists 
would assign a low-priority, for not every culture has a ritual 
which serves ethnologists as a unique focus for describing values.8 
The Nuer, who otherwise have a culture of great paradig- 
matic value, have no institution which sums up their values, 
although cattle were said by Evans-Pritchard to be at the center 
of all Nuer interests. Someone searching for potential "Balinese 
cockfights" among the Nuer would be frustrated, or would have 
to redefine the concept substantially (making it more operational 
in the process) to uncover even a reasonable surrogate. Indeed, a 
more useful search might be for the reason why so few societies 
develop this kind of focal institution.9 
Besides the Balinese, the two best known examples of soci- 
eties which have focal institutions are the Trobriand Islanders, 
7 For example, W. R. Prest, "Stability and Change in Old and New England: Clayworth 
and Dedham,"Journal of Interdisciplinary History, VI (1976), 359-374. 
8 Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in idem, The Interpretation of 
Cultures, 412-453. 
9 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (New York, 1940), I6-50. 
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who observe the Kula ring ritual, and the Kwakiutl, who have 
the potlatch. Both are original examples of what Mauss called 
"total social phenomena." But the Balinese, the Trobianders, and 
the Kwakiutl have all developed self-consciously stratified soci- 
eties, and lack an ideology of upward social mobility. Both the 
Balinese and Kwakiutl conceptualize their societies as sets of per- 
manent statuses which people occupy temporarily. Trobriand 
chiefs, however, look forward to the receipt, and temporary own- 
ership, of legendary, named valuables which circulate in perpe- 
tuity, while their owners are quickly replaced. In all three cases 
the earthly order of things is permanent, and is suffused with a 
sense of the importance of etiquette for the proper management 
of status. 10 
The frontier of colonial America is an unlikely place to find 
the cultural equivalents of a Balinese cockfight, a Kula ring, or a 
potlatch, given that, for those settlers who were interested in the 
here and now, it was a new social beginning, and, for those to 
whom it was but a temporary way station, other considerations 
took precedence over earthly status. Yet there was a ritual in New 
England which summed up the values of the society which prac- 
ticed it: Sunday church-going, with the whole community ar- 
ranged in pews which reflected the relative social ranking of the 
parishioners, who came to hear a sermon embodying the dominant 
values. Although the medium for their expression may seem too 
prosaic to be a true equivalent of the exotic cockfight, the insti- 
tution of church-going had the virtue, true as well of the cock- 
fight, that the participants were undertaking a life-or-death wager, 
not on their social status, but on their chance for salvation.1 
If we were to accept this as a reasonable surrogate for the 
cockfight, we would have to inquire as to whether other parts of 
the model applied as well. Was New England actually more 
stratified than is usually thought, or was it more worldly? Or 
were these attributes of our putative model of a focal ritual simply 
contingent? Perhaps other attributes were crucial. One possible 
line of inquiry might be to determine the degree to which such 
institutions bridge a disjunction between two audiences: the cock- 
Io Marcel Mauss, The Gift (London, I954). 
II Frederick Augustus Whitney, "A Church of the First Congregational Society in 
Quincy, Mass., Built in 1732," New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XVIII 
(1864), II7-131. 
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fight often pits members of one community against members of 
another, as do the Kula ring and the potlatch. If we take this 
condition as fundamental, then a Sunday church service in New 
England would not be a viable example. Moreover, in all three 
of the anthropological examples the rituals socially humiliate cer- 
tain participants, without engendering any sense of religious hu- 
mility in the process. They are the opposite of the ritual activity 
which Turner has characterized as "communitas": an evanescent 
historical moment in which a mood of human fellowship pervades 
the social relations of people who are otherwise caught up in the 
humanly divisive, hierarchical relations found in all societies. Po- 
tlatch, Kula, and cockfight, on the contrary, display social hier- 
archy.12 
This is not the place to develop a model of such institutions, 
but it is appropriate to consider them in order to suggest the kind 
of comparative work that could be done by historians. No such 
work was done by Beeman when he advised historians that an 
unappreciated resource lay in Turner's concept of communitas. 
In fact he proposed a misreading: Beeman mistakes it for some- 
thing akin to Redfield's "community." Yet Turner's idea is pre- 
cisely that communitas, being a transient mood, cannot be cap- 
tured in any social institution, and that attempts to do so have 
always failed. There is a certain nostalgia in Beeman's enthusiasm 
for the concept (possibly true of Turner as well), which anthro- 
pology is being employed to erase. It is also symptomatic of the 
preference for such ideological concepts that, although Beeman 
should find Turner's work on communitas attractive, he has ap- 
parently overlooked the equally substantial contribution which 
Turner made to the understanding of the politics of small villages 
in which almost everyone was related and where witchcraft ac- 
cusations were common. For that matter, which social historians 
read The Lele or Agricultural Involution?13 
Beeman seems to ask of Turner's work on communitas that 
12 For a recent study which cites much of the relevant literature on stratification, see 
William Pencak, "The Social Structure of Revolutionary Boston: Evidence from the Great 
Fire of I76o,"Journal of Interdisciplinary History, X (1979), 267-278. 
13 Richard R. Beeman, "The New Social History and the Search for 'Community' in 
Colonial America," American Quarterly, XXIX (I977), 422-443; Turner, Ritual Process; 
Robert Redfield, The Little Community (Chicago, 1955); idem, Peasant Society and Culture 
(Chicago, 1955); Turner, Schism and Continuity in an African Society (Manchester, 1957). 
Mary Douglas, The Lele (London, 1954); Geertz, Agricultural Involution (Chicago, I963). 
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it cure the theoretical disjunction which Beeman experiences be- 
tween structure and psychology, that is, between a science of 
society which focuses impersonally on the structure of a group 
and a science which depicts lives of individuals in readily intuited 
psychological descriptions. Yet the dialectical oscillation between 
hierarchy and communitas is precisely Turner's way of dramatiz- 
ing the ever-present gap between structure and psychology and 
his way of asserting that it can never be finally overcome.14 
To investigate historical phenomena by means of concepts 
like communitas and the Balinese cockfight without examining 
them is to engage in la pensee sauvage. It is also utopian thinking 
in the case of communitas, and a complete misunderstanding of 
the nature of history and cross-cultural comparison in the case of 
the Balinese cockfight. 
EXOTICISM When a ritual event is alleged to be, in effect, the 
total activity of an entire town, as is the case in so many studies, 
it is essential to break through that sort of immaterial conception 
to place it in the more immediate context of ordinary daily life. 
Waters' characterization of Guilford, Connecticut, as made up of 
stem-family households is an example of deliberate exoticism used 
to suggest the rootedness of the settlers as contrasted with our 
own supposedly more rootless times. He ignores the fact that 
there must be sufficient people of the right sex and age in Guilford 
for stem-family households to be common, and that no such type, 
given the nature of the variables, can ever solely characterize a 
society. Indeed, if there is any law in anthropology, it is a law of 
exceptions: that variations will be found in every rule or pattern.15 
The concept of the stem family household cannot be applied 
to New England, as computer simulation shows. Herein lies a 
potential trap for unwary historians who use ideas from anthro- 
pology: there is a widespread, persistent feeling that anthropolo- 
gists study exotic customs, whereas it is truer to say that they 
study the mundane in exotic locales. As for the exotic itself, they 
seem always to reduce it to some (outlandishly) commonsense 
14 Beeman, "New Social History," 431, n. I8. 
IS John Waters, "Patrimony, Succession, and Social Stability: Guilford, Connecticut, in 
the Eighteenth Century," Perspectives in American History, X (I976), I3I-I60. 
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explanation, such as that ritual cannibalism is a response to protein 
deficiency.16 
Far from examining only the curious ritual occasion, anthro- 
pologists begin by counting populations and mapping villages. 
They hope that, by spending a year in the field, they can shed 
light, not only on the natives' way of life, but on their unconscious 
expectations as well. Since the exotic is only so in relation to our 
own culture, anthropologists have a professional distrust of the 
exotic, and at times virtually refuse to recognize that it exists. 
A major difficulty in the development of knowledge in both 
ethnography and history is precisely this culture of the investi- 
gator, which even now goes largely unexamined because it resists 
discovery. Outsiders see it readily enough, which makes field- 
work on an island in the Pacific both easy and intellectually sat- 
isfying in ways which elude students of their own backyards, 
including historians of colonial America. What we do need to 
find out is whether what we study is ordinary and mundane, or 
whether the ordinary and mundane is merely a more pernicious 
version of our culture's commonsense understanding of things. 
Similarly it is important for historians to continue asking why 
they study particular phenomena. 
TOWARD THE I980S In the next decade both anthropology and 
history will themselves become topics for investigation, as natural 
history has become for historians. The emerging ethnology will 
be one which examines the ordinary and the folklife, not the 
unusual, the highbrow, or the exotic. As anthropologists we will 
undertake research which parallels that of history without people, 
and of processual history, while social historians will examine 
implicit assumptions of daily life, which are free of the officially 
declared, contemporary values, and have not been formally ri- 
tualized by the community. Demos' use of the implications for 
daily living of the sizes and locations of rooms in Plymouth 
houses and Boyer and Nissenbaum's uncovering of the network 
of kinship in Salem are examples of such research. The common 
sense of a culture dwells close to material constraints-and does 
not question them. It will be our job to discover the premises 
I6 Kenneth Wachter et al., Statistical Studies of Historical Social Structure (New York, 
1978). 
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which underlie this common sense and justify behavior as per- 
fectly natural.17 
Anthropologists have had little feeling for how the daily 
activities of the peoples that they study could become historical. 
Theirs is a wholly different perspective on daily life from that of 
historians, who write with the advantage of hindsight. Which 
historians can look at people's lives and not think of those con- 
temporaneous events which history has singled out as important? 
Historians implicitly scrutinize all behavior for its potential rela- 
tionship to the eventful. Anthropologists have their comparable 
teleological flaw: that everything they see during their short stints 
of fieldwork must be integrated in some way. Foucault, a social 
historian, has presented a solution to this latter problem in his call 
for an archaeology of knowledge. He suggests that we regard the 
array of facts at a given moment as if it were one layer of an 
archaeological dig, in which some elements cluster in meaningful 
association, but where others simply happen to be there and elude 
connection with the clusters. Anthropologists might, in turn, 
remind historians of colonial America that not every action has 
a cumulative historical goal.18 
Here are two very different conceptions of human activity: 
the anthropologist's, which seldom conceives of the possibility 
that the moments of daily life might lead to anything for the 
history books; and the historian's, which often must see in each 
and every moment a determinant of some significant future or an 
exemplification of some significant past. At best (or worst?) an- 
thropologists think of mundane actions as representative of socio- 
logical principles-although these principles are not confused with 
the actor's motivations. 
At first anthropologists considered human action as some- 
thing of an end in itself, a timeless round of custom. But this false 
start gave way to the discovery of a repertory of goals which 
were commonsensical and maximizing: to obtain a good harvest, 
to outdo a neighbor in gift-giving, to marry well, to get better 
17 On anthropology see Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism (New 
York, 1972); on "history" see loan M. Lewis, "Introduction," in idenm (ed.), History and 
Social Anthropology (London, I968). Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York, 
1970). John Demos, A Little Cotnimonwealth (New York, 1970); Boyer and Nissenbaum, 
Salem Possessed. 
18 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knolvledge (New York, 1972). 
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land, or to maintain one's following. This discovery restored to 
the pages of ethnographic description a goal-oriented actor, but 
one who was concerned with everyday activities not epic deeds. 
To anthropologists who are not much concerned with action 
from its historical perspective, many historians of colonial Amer- 
ica seem to have their ears always cocked to the distant rumblings 
of the Revolution. This teleology gives the work of historians an 
idealistic cast. Historians might try to forget the eventful in favor 
of a history of simpler, everyday life. There is after all a major 
difference between behavior which is self-consciously trying to 
be historical and behavior which turns out to be historical. 
THE METAPHOR OF TEXT Recently Geertz suggested the meta- 
phor of social behavior as text as a supplement for, or replacement 
of, the current metaphors of role-playing and games. To anthro- 
pologists this would transfer the traditions of literary interpreta- 
tion to the study of behavior and thereby reframe behavior in a 
less reductionistic manner by suggesting that it is at least as com- 
plex, meaningful, and ambiguous as a good novel or poem. If the 
metaphor of text were to be adopted generally as a perspective, 
social anthropology would be even less inclined to turn the salient 
institutions of one society into ideal types for use in examining 
the social life of neighboring societies.19 
However, if text were to become fashionable as a way of 
bringing to anthropology the baggage of post-structuralist literary 
criticism, with its concern for conjunctures, the mirror phase, and 
intertextuality, the course of inquiry in social anthropology would 
probably shift to a rethinking of normative authority; to a deem- 
phasis on the psychic unity of mankind in favor of uncovering 
the significant differences between ourselves and "The Others" 
whom we study; and to a concern with what is missing in a 
people's discourse and in our ethnographies. 
What this refocusing would not emphasize is the sense of 
text as historians most frequently use it-as a vehicle for knowl- 
edge about the past. To be more relevant for historians the met- 
aphor would have to be extended from the documents themselves 
I9 Geertz, "Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought," The American Scholar, 
XLIX (I980), I65-179; see also Alton L. Becker, "Text-Building, Epistemology, and 
Aesthetics in Javanese Shadow Theater," in idem and Aram Yengoyan (eds.), The Imagi- 
nation f Reality (Norwood, N.J., I979), 211-243. 
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to the behavior described within them, behavior which is often 
ambivalent and polyvalent. 
The sense of unity and decorum of a narrative, the sense of 
what is an integral part of any story is a basic part of the everyday 
culture in which it is told. When Greven tells us that the basic 
goal of the inhabitants of Andover was to remain in Andover, 
preferably on the family farm, but that demography and land 
shortage prevented them from doing so; that in the third gener- 
ation the sons of Andover were obliged to migrate to new lands; 
and that this restlessness was a cause of the Revolution, we have 
not progressed very far from the old-fashioned history of events. 
Demography merely replaces Governor Thomas Dudley (or 
whomever) as the villain of the story. It behooves historians to 
learn about the general form of narrative. The metaphor of text 
should be useful in this discovery, especially since there has been 
a recent call to return to the narrative.20 
Historians of colonial America, often portray their subjects as 
behaving with a view to their place in the history books. This is 
especially noticeable to anthropologists because we are so often 
unable to give any account of history in our descriptions. The 
subjects of ethnographies are usually constrained to behave only 
with regard to finite tasks in the realm of common sense. This 
perspective presents us with problems but, from the anthropol- 
ogists' point of view, much of social history is misconceived 
because of the teleology of historians' hindsight. 
My depiction of social history is obviously too dark and too 
much drawn with the parochial bias of an outsider. But it raises 
important issues for the writing of history and of anthropology. 
First, to what extent do our data really mesh? And second, to 
what extent does social life have a historical goal which transcends 
immediate situations? My answers are those of the skeptic. 
Historians have worried about these same issues and anthro- 
pologists have not absorbed everything they might from the prac- 
tice of history. The place of a historical consciousness in ethnog- 
20 PhilipJ. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, 
Massachusetts (Ithaca, 1970). A useful introduction to narrative analysis is Claude Bremond, 
Logique du recit (Paris, I973). Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on 
a New Old History," Past & Present, 85 (I979), 3-24. 
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raphy will have to be reassessed. First, historians who are 
interested in social or cultural history should try to eliminate 
exotica and fantasies of a Golden Age of community. Instead, 
they should turn more scrupulously to the mundane, with its 
pettiness and dissensions, as well as its cooperativeness. If histo- 
rians borrow from anthropology, it should be with the intention 
of developing the concepts borrowed and of making, in return, 
a contribution to anthropology. Either social history is anthro- 
pology or it is nothing. Dabbling with it will do no good. His- 
torians must reflect on what they borrow. 
Second, as part of a general trend toward self-consciousness, 
both historians and anthropologists will study history and folk 
history in particular, and its uses in our own culture. What do 
ordinary people take to be history? Why do television writers see 
history as a series of lucky moments for the uniquely gifted 
protagonists of a true story? These are the kinds of questions 
which anthropologists ask of preliterate peoples. As they shift 
their attention to groups within our own culture, they will ask 
these questions of us. 
Third, when anthropologists have identified the common 
sense of our culture, they will want to see how and when it was 
institutionalized. Research along these lines would be a useful 
extension of Foucault's attempts to uncover the archaeology of 
the more highbrow concepts in our society. An even more recent 
example of a historian's work along these lines is Ginzburg, 
"Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes."21 
History must become more reflexive about its goals and 
about the means it uses to realize its ends. To anthropologists the 
lack of interest in theory among historians still seems great. But 
borrowing concepts from another discipline does not hold out 
much promise either if the concepts are simply misused in a 
thoughtless way. 
2I For example, Foucault, Madness and Civilization (New York, I965); idem, Discipline 
and Punishment (New York, 1979). Carlo Ginzburg, "Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock 
Holmes," History Workshop, IX (I980), 5-36. 
